Using our tool Geneva, we have discovered how to circumvent censorship from the server-side: with no client participation whatsoever. This opens up new avenues for helping people evade censorship, even if they didn’t realize they were being censored in the first place.

The Great Firewall (GFW) of China has recently begun blocking ESNI—one of the foundational features of TLS 1.3 and HTTPS. We empirically demonstrate what triggers this censorship and how long residual censorship lasts. We also present several evasion strategies discovered by Geneva that can be run either client-side or server-side to evade blocking.

We’re excited to announce the full code base of Geneva is now public! Click to read more about the code, how to use it, and why we are releasing it.

Tune in to our talk with the OONI Internet Measurement Village!

Ahead of its February 21st elections and amidst the chaos of COVID-19, Iran quietly deployed a second censorship system: a protocol whitelister. Click read more to learn about how the protocol whitelister works and how we can circumvent it.

Kevin and George spoke at BlueHat IL in Tel Aviv. Click read more to see their talk and slides.

Kevin spoke at CCS in London. Click read more to see their talk and slides.